We study two-stage elimination Tullock contests. In the …rst stage all the players compete against each other of which some advance to the second stage while the others are eliminated. The …nalists compete against each other in the second stage and one of them wins the prize. To maximize the expected total e¤ort the designer can give a head start to the winner of the …rst stage when he competes against the other …nalists in the second stage. We show that the optimal head start, independent of the number of …nalists, always increases the players'expected total e¤ort. We also show how the number of players and …nalists a¤ect the value of the optimal head start.
Introduction
In elimination contests in each stage some of the contestants are eliminated while the others advance to the next stage until the …nal stage in which some of the players (usually one of them) win prizes. In elimination tournaments in sport, players or teams usually play pair-wise matches and the winner advances to the next stage while the loser is eliminated from the competition. Examples include the ATP tennis tournaments and the professional playo¤s in US-Basketball or World Cup playo¤s. In this paper we study two-stage elimination Tullock contests (Tullock 1980) 1 where in the …rst stage all the n players compete against each other and k; k n; players (…nalists) proceed to the second (…nal) stage. The contestants exert their e¤orts once in the …rst stage and the …nalists are determined sequentially. The …rst winner is determined by the probability success function considering the e¤orts of all the players. The second winner is determined by the probability success function considering the e¤orts of all the contestants excluding the e¤ort of the …rst winner. This sequential process continues until all the …nalists are determined. The winners in the second stage win the prizes. 2 To illustrate, such a two-stage elimination contest can be a preliminary contest in which all the contestants are interviewed for a job and a …nal stage in which a few …nalists are interviewed and tested. 3 Fu and Lu (2012) studied a multi-stage sequential elimination Tullock contest, and showed that the optimal contest eliminates one contestant at each stage until the …nal stage. Then, the winner of the …nal takes the entire prize sum. However, their result to eliminate only one player in the …rst stage does not hold when the number of stages is limited, especially when there are only two stages. In such a case, the contest designer can decide about the number of players who advance from the …rst stage to the second one and the incentives he can give them. Such an incentive could be a head start, an exogenously determined mechanism that increases the winning probabilities of some contestants. By using a head start, the contest 1 A number of studies provided axiomatic justi…cation for the Tullock contest (see, for example, Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998)). Baye and Hoppe (2003) have identi…ed conditions under which a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games are strategically equivalent to the Tullock contest. 2 Clark and Riis (1996) considered the same method to select the winners in one-stage Tullock contests.
designer can a¤ect the e¤ort levels of the contestants. 4 This was shown by Konrad (2002) the designer who wishes to maximize the contestants'total e¤ort may allocate asymmetric success functions (which are equivalent to di¤erent head starts) for the contestants. They showed that the optimal contest rule is biased in favor of weaker contestants, i.e., stronger contestants are relatively discouraged while weaker contestants are encouraged both to participate and to exert higher e¤orts. 5 In other words, head starts should be given to the weak players. While Franke et al. found the optimal head starts in a one-stage
Tullock contest which are given according to the players'types, we …nd the optimal head start in a two-stage Tullock contest which is given to the winner of the …rst stage according to his performance in that stage.
For simplicity, we begin with the analysis of the most common case in which there are only two …nalists in the second (…nal) stage. We demonstrate that the entire prize sum should be awarded to the winner of the …nal stage only. Later, we generalize the model for any number of …nalists, and we assume that the entire prize sum is awarded to the winner in the …nal stage. Then, we show that awarding a head start to the winner in the …rst stage, independent of the number of …nalists, always increases the players'total e¤ort.
This result implies that the elimination two-stage contest with a head start dominates the one-stage contest with respect to the contestants'total e¤ort.
We also explicitly calculate the optimal head start and show that its value decreases in the number of players. The optimal head start is not monotonic in the number of …nalists. We illustrate that it decreases in the number of …nalists, obtains its minimal value and then increases again. In particular, the optimal head start has the same value if the number of …nalists is either two or equal to the number of players.
Last, we calculate the optimal head start together with the optimal number of …nalists. We …rst show that if the number of players is three then the optimal number of …nalists is three as well. We then show that the optimal number of …nalists increases in the value of the head start. By our analysis, we can calculate the combination of the optimal head start and the optimal number of …nalists for any number of players.
For instance, given the optimal head start, if the number of players is three the optimal number of …nalists is three as well (all the players advance to the …nal stage), but if the number of players is 100, the optimal number of …nalists is 27. Our calculations show that, given the optimal head start, when the number of players is relatively large, a change in the number of players yields a very small change in the optimal number of …nalists.
Related literature
In this paper we assume that the designer can determine the players' contest success functions. However, in the literature on elimination tournaments it is usually assumed that the structure of the tournament is given and the contest designer can determine the players'allocation in the tournament. Similarly to previous works we show that it is not pro…table for the contest designer to split the prize in the …nal stage. For example, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) showed that in one-stage all-pay contests under incomplete information when cost functions are linear or concave in e¤ort, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single …rst prize, but when cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be optimal. Later (2006) these authors studied two-stage all-pay contests with multiple prizes under incomplete information and showed that for a contest designer who maximizes the expected total e¤ort, if the cost functions are linear in e¤ort, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single …rst prize. In Tullock contests, Schweinzer and Segev (2009) demonstrated that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player
Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize sum to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists.
In 
The model with two …nalists
We …rst study an elimination two-stage Tullock contest with n 3 players. In the …rst stage, all the n players simultaneously exert their e¤orts and only two of them (so called …nalists) advance to the second (…nal) stage, while all the other players are eliminated. If player i; i = 1; 2; :::; n exerts an e¤ort x i in the …rst stage then his probability to be the …rst to advance to the …nal stage is
and his probability to be the second to advance to the …nal stage is
Thus, player i's probability to advance to the …nal stage is
We assume that the …rst prize for the winner in the …nal stage is > 0:5 while the second prize for the loser is 1 : A player has an incentive to be the …rst to advance to the …nal stage if he receives a head start that improves his probability to win the …rst prize in the …nal stage. Formally, if player i is the …rst to advance to the …nal stage and player j is the second, then if they exert e¤orts of y i ; y j respectively, player i's probability to win the …rst prize is 
The second stage
The maximization problem in the second stage of the …nalist who won in the …rst stage is
where y 2 is the other …nalist's e¤ort whose maximization problem is
The F.O.C. satisfy
Thus, the equilibrium e¤orts in the second stage are
Since > 0:5 the …nalists'e¤orts in the second stage satisfy y 1 = y 2 > 0: The expected payo¤ of the winner in the …rst stage is
and the expected payo¤ of the other …nalist is
It can be easily shown that if is su¢ ciently high (i.e., close enough to 1) then u 1 ; u 2 > 0: We can now proceed to the analysis of the equilibrium in the …rst stage.
The …rst stage
By (1), (3) and (4), the maximization problem of player i; i = 1; 2; :::; n in the …rst stage is
By symmetry, we obtain
Thus, we have Proposition 1 In the subgame perfect equilibrium, the strategy of every player in the …rst stage of the elimination two-stage contest with two …nalists is
while the …nalists' strategies in the second stage are given by (2).
The players'total e¤ort in both stages is then given by
2 (n 2 + n 3n + 1) + (4n Thus, if > 1 we obtain that dT E d > 0, namely, it is optimal to award the entire prize sum (which is equal to 1) to the winner in the second stage. From this point on we will assume that only one prize is awarded,
i.e., = 1. Then, we can see that when n approaches 1 we obtain
The optimal head start that yields the highest expected total e¤ort is given by
This implies that
2 < 0, the maximal value of the optimal head start is obtained for n = 3 ( = 2:5)
and is decreasing in the number of players n. When n approaches in…nity it converges to 2. Figure 1 presents the expected total e¤ort as a function of the head start when the number of players is n = 3.
[ Figure 1 to be here].
We can see that when n = 3, the highest total e¤ort is obtained for = 2:5 where the players' total e¤ort increases for every 1 2:5 and decreases for all > 2:5: If we compare the players'performances in our model and the one-stage Tullock model we obtain that Proposition 2 For any number of players n 3, the expected total e¤ ort in the two-stage elimination contest either with or without the optimal head start is larger than in the one-stage contest.
Proof. The total e¤ort in the standard (one-stage) Tullock contest with n symmetric players and a prize equal to 1 is
By (5), the di¤erence between the total e¤ort in the two-stage elimination Tullock contest with the optimal head start = 2:5 and the one-stage contest is
Furthermore, by (5), the di¤erence between the total e¤ort in the two-stage elimination Tullock contest without any head start and the one-stage contest is
(n 2) > 0 Figure 2 presents the total e¤ort in the two-stage elimination contest and in the standard (one-stage) one.
[ Figure 2 to be here].
In the next section we generalize the model to any number of …nalists k; 2 k n.
The model with k 2 …nalists
We now study a two-stage Tullock contest when in the …rst stage all the n players simultaneously exert their e¤orts and k; 2 k n of them advance to the second stage. Following the result in the previous section according to which the entire prize sum should be allocated to the winner in the second stage, we assume that the k …nalists compete against each other to win a prize equal to 1, where the winner in the …rst stage has a head start advantage that increases his winning probability compared to his rivals. By symmetry, we denote the e¤ort of every contestant j; j 6 = i by x j = x. Then, if player i exerts an e¤ort x i his probability to win in the …rst stage is The probability of player i to be the second to advance to the …nal is
Similarly, the probability of player i to be the s-th, s = 3; 4; :::; k to advance to the …nal is x(n 1) (n 1)x + x i x(n 2) (n 2)x + x i ::::
In sum, the probability of player i to advance to the …nal stage is given by
Each player has an incentive to be the …rst to advance to the …nal stage since then he receives a head start that improves his probability to win in the …nal. Formally, let y j = y; 1 j k and j 6 = i, then if player i is the …rst to advance to the …nal stage among k …nalists and he exerts an e¤ort y i his probability to win is y i y i + (k 1)y where 1 is a commonly known head start determined by the contest designer and y = y j ; j 6 = i is the symmetric e¤ort of all the …nalists except player i. We begin with the analysis of the second stage and go backwards to the …rst one.
The second stage
The maximization problem in the second stage of the …nalist (denoted as player 1) who won in the …rst stage
where y is the symmetric e¤ort of all the other …nalists. The maximization problem of a …nalist j; j 6 = 1;
who did not win in the …rst stage is
where y 1 is the e¤ort of the winner in the …rst stage, and y is the symmetric e¤ort of all the other …nalists.
Since y j = y; the F.O.C. yield
y = y j = (k 1) ( (k 1) + 1) 2 ; j = 2; :::; k Then, the total e¤ort in the second stage is
The expected payo¤ of the winner in the …rst stage is
and the expected payo¤s of the other …nalists are u j = 1 ( (k 1) + 1) 2 ; j = 2; :::; k
We can now proceed to the analysis of the equilibrium in the …rst stage.
The …rst stage
By (7), (9) and (10), the maximization problem of player i; i = 1; ::::; n in the …rst stage is
where x is the symmetric e¤ort of all the other players. By the symmetry, the F.O.C. yields
Thus, we obtain that Proposition 3 In the subgame perfect equilibrium the strategy of every player in the …rst stage of the elimination two-stage contest with k 2 …nalists is
! while the …nalists' strategies in the second stage are given by (8) .
Then, the total e¤ort in the …rst stage is
! and the total e¤ort in both stages is
We have assumed that the winner in the …rst stage receives a head start > 1 in the second stage. The following result shows that awarding a head start in the …rst stage is an e¢ cient tool for maximizing the players'total e¤ort.
Proposition 4
In the two-stage elimination contest awarding a head start > 1 to the winner in the …rst stage, independent of the number of …nalists, always increases the players' total e¤ ort.
Proof. The derivative of (11) yields
When approaches one we obtain that
We obtain,
Therefore, the head start > 1, independent of the number of the …nalists k; increases the players' total e¤ort. Now, given that a head start is an e¢ cient tool for increasing the players'total e¤ort, it is worthwhile to …nd out what the optimal head start is and examine how it changes as a function of the number of …nalists.
Proposition 5 In the two-stage elimination contest with n players and k …nalists, the optimal head start for the winner in the …rst stage is
Proof. The F.O.C. of the maximization of the total e¤ort given by (11) is
By some calculations we have
The following result shows the e¤ect of the number of players on the optimal head start.
Proposition 6
In the two-stage elimination contest the value of the optimal heat start decreases in the number of players n.
Proof. By (13), we obtain that
Now we …x the number of the players and change only the number of the …nalists. Accordingly, Figure 3 presents the optimal head start as a function of the number of …nalists k when the number of players is [ Figure 3 to be here]. We can see by the …gure that the optimal head start …rst decreases and later increases in the number of …nalists k: The minimal value of the optimal head start is obtained when the number of …nalists is k = 17, and the maximal value of the optimal head start is obtained when the number of …nalists is either k = 2 or k = n = 100: The last result can be generalized as follows:
Proposition 7 In the two-stage elimination contest the optimal head start has the same value if the number of …nalists is either two or is equal to the number of players.
Proof. By (6) we have
and by (13) we also have Figure 3 showed that the optimal head start (k) may either increase or decrease in the number of …nalists. However, if the number of players is su¢ ciently high we obtain that Proposition 8 In the two-stage elimination contest if the number of players approaches in…nity then the optimal head start decreases in the number of …nalists.
Proof. By (13) we have
By L'hopital's rule we obtain
Thus, when the number of players n converges to in…nity, the optimal head start decreases in the number of …nalists k.
So far we have analyzed the optimal head start for any number of …nalists k; but we can also calculate the optimal number of …nalists k given the optimal head start. Suppose …rst that the number of players is n = 3: Then by Proposition 7 and (6), the optimal head start is the same for either two or three …nalists and is equal to = 2:5: Thus, by (5) the total e¤ort with two …nalists is T E(k = 2) = 0:7483, while by (11) the total e¤ort with three …nalists is T E(k = 3) = 0:7546. Thus we have
Proposition 9
In the two-stage elimination contest with three players it is optimal to advance all the players to the …nal stage when the winner in the …rst stage has the optimal head start = 2:5:
We can now numerically analyze the optimal number of …nalists for any number of players n > 3.
Consider …rst a two-stage elimination contest without a head start, i.e., = 1. Then, the optimal number We can see that the optimal number of …nalists increases in the number of players n. The optimal numbers of …nalists k for di¤erent values of the head start when the number of players is n = 100 are We can see that the optimal number of …nalists k ( ) increases in the value of the head start , but from a relatively large …nite value of , the optimal number of …nalists almost does not change. By our analysis, we can …nd the optimal two-stage elimination contest for any number of players, as shown in Figure 4 where we …nd the optimal head start and then calculate the players'total e¤ort for any number of …nalists. [ Figure   4 to be here]. We can see that if the number of players is n = 100, the highest total e¤ort is obtained when the number of …nalists is 27. Then the optimal head start is = 1:57:
In contrast to the one-stage contest in which the designer can a¤ect the players'performance (e¤ort) mostly by determining the prize structure, in multi-stage contests he has other tools to a¤ect these performances.
In our two-stage elimination contest, for instance, the designer determines the number of …nalists and the head start given to the winner in the …rst stage. We showed that, independent of the number of …nalists, it is optimal for the designer to maximize the players' total e¤ort by giving a head start to the winner in the …rst stage such that he will have some advantage in the competition in the …nal stage. Moreover, we
showed that the contest designer can increase the players' total e¤ort by the optimal combination of the number of …nalists and the head start given to the winner in the …rst stage. We found that the optimal head start is monotonically decreasing in the number of players but is not a monotonic function of the number of the …nalists, while the number of …nalists is monotonically increasing in the number of players.
We demonstrated that by controlling some structural parameters of the two-stage elimination contest the designer can signi…cantly increase the contestants'performance compared to the one-stage contest.
